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FOREWORD-The Burger Court-1973 Term:
Leaving the Sixties Behind Us
Marshall J. Hartman*
The Supreme Court in the seventies, the
Burger Court, is a champion of law and order.
The pendulum, which swung so widely in
favor of the accused under the late Chief Jus-
tice Warren, has returned and now traverses
the adverse arc, presumably towards the
greater protection of society.
However, implicit in the statement that the
actions of the Burger Court are in the greater
interests of the public is the belief that "nice"
people are never arrested, that the average
man-on-the-street will never be accused of a
crime, that innocent people are never con-
victed, that the fourth amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable searches or seizures is for
someone else's protection. Where there is
smoke, there is fire; indictment means guilt.
Perhaps, just perhaps, these beliefs are not sol-
idly founded in the realities of our criminal
justice system. Perhaps the Warren Court was
protecting the public, and the Burger Court is
slowly eroding this protection, right-by-right.
This most recent October Term illustrates
this point better than no other. Certainly this
Court has been responsible for some outstand-
ing decisions which were favorable to defend-
ants, such as Argersinger v. Hamlin.' But this
last year, the Burger Court refused to extend
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to a
defendant whose Miranda rights were admit-
tedly violated; 2 it denied indigents the right to
court appointed counsel in the pursuit of discre-
tionary review;5 it chilled an indigent's exer-
cise of his or her right to counsel by requiring,
*Director of the Defender Services, National
Legal Aid and Defenders Association. The author
wishes to express his appreciation to Nancy E.
Goldberg, Deputy Director of Defender Services
of N.L.A.D.A., Robert J. Koss, Staff Attorney of
N.L.A.D.A., and Daniel Swartzman for their as-
sistance in the preparation of this article.
1407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right-to-counsel extended
to indigents on trial for misdemeanors where pun-
ishment by imprisonment is possible).
2 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) ; see
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
as a condition of probation, the payment of
state-incurred costs for appointed counsel ;4 it
allowed a complete search of an individual who
was stopped for a mere traffic offense;5 and it
declined to enforce the exclusionary rule before
a grand jury after an admittedly illegal
search.e The Court overruled (sub silentio)
Preston v. U.S.7 by allowing a warrantless
search of a car parked in a public lot one-half
of a block from the police station." Also, this
disinclination to uphold what the Warren
Court found to be basic rights of each and
every citizen led the seventies Court to uphold
the "general articles" of military law (which
provide punishment for behavior "unbecoming
an officer") against a constitutional attack, re-
sulting in the defendant's spending some five
years of his life in prison for criticizing the
Vietnam War while in uniform and for refus-
ing to train Green Berets headed for Southeast
Asia.9
Note: through all this Justices Douglas,
Brennan and Marshall filed their dissents.
It was not always so. At one time these Jus-
tices were part of the liberal majority who sat
on the bench during the Warren years in the
sixties. They, joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black, Goldberg and later Fortas,
were a court which made a fundamental con-
tribution to the enforcement of the Bill of
Rights by ordering that these liberties be ob-
served in all courts of our land, federal or
state.
It is often forgotten that, prior to the ac-
tions of the Warren Court, virtually none of
the rights contained in the first ten amend-
4Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
5 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973).6 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974).
1376 U.S. 364 (1974).
8 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
9 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). See also
Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, - U.S. - (1974).
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ments were applied to Americans in state
courts. Although they were always deemed
available to defendants accused of federal of-
fenses, these rights were denied to those ac-
cused of equally serious state offenses, as well
as to all defendants in misdeameanor cases.
In 1833 the issue as to whether the Bill of
Rights was to be applied to state governments
first came up. The Supreme Court held they
were not.'0 In 1865 Senator Howard and Con-
gressman Bingham introduced legislation in
both houses of Congress to force application of
these amendments to defendants in state courts.
These bills resulted in the passage of the four-
teenth amendment. Nevertheless, the Court in
decision after decision continued to hold that
the Bill of Rights still did not apply to defend-
ants charged in state courts."'
It was not until the Court of the sixties and
its doctrine of selective incorporation that the
Bill of Rights received this wider application.
In Justice Black's view, after the passage of
the fourteenth amendment all of the constitu-
tional liberties applied to state defendants.
However Justice Harlan felt that the Bill of
Rights should not become a straight jacket for
our legal rights. Other Justices felt that there
was no historical precedent which mandated
their application in one fell swoop.'
2
The majority of the Warren Court did, how-
ever, accept the proposition that they could
extend the eight key amendments to the states
one at a time on a case-by-case basis whenever
they determined that a specific provision was
"fundamental to the American scheme of jus-
tice."13
Following this plan, the Warren Court, in
1961, determined in Mapp v. Ohio'4 that the
exclusionary rule was part and parcel of the
fourth amendment and, as such, must be ap-
plied to the states. In 1962 the Court held that
the eighth amendment "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment" clause was obligatory on the states.
10 Barron v. Baltimore 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 234
(1833).
" See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1946) (Black, J., dissenting); see generally W.
CROSSEY, POLITICS AND TIIE CONSTITUTION
(1953).
22 See generally Hartman, The Great Debate, 33
NLADA BalarcAsE 58 (1972).
Is Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795
(1969).
14 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Robinson v. California.'5 In 1963, the Court
extended the right to counsel, guaranteed by
the sixth amendment, to a state defendant. Gid-
eon v. Wainwright.16 In 1964 the Court de-
cided that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination was enforceable in
state court. Malloy v. Hogan.7 (This paved
the way for Miranda v. Arizona'3 in 1966.)
In 1965 the sixth amendment right of con-
frontation was held to be binding upon the
states, Pointer v. Texas, 9 and in 1967 two de-
cisions held the rights of speedy trial and com-
pulsory process were available to state defend-
ants. Klopfer v. North Carolina,20 Washington
v. Texas.
21
Similarly, in 1968, the Warren Court re-
versed the conviction of a 19 year old youth
who had been denied a jury trial under Louisi-
ana law. In so holding, the Court applied the
sixth amendment right to trial by jury to state
criminal prosecutions. Duncan v. Louisiana.22
In 1969 the cycle was completed, as the
Court held the fifth amendment's prohibition
against double jeopardy to be binding on the
states. Benton v. Maryland.
23
I recite this litany to show that the Warren
Court, far from making new law as has been
charged in certain sectors of our country, in
fact merely restored to the American people
that which many Americans thought belonged
to them back in 1791 after they made the Bill
of Rights a condition precedent to their ratify-
ing the Constitution. As Justice Black
wrote:
The first ten amendments were proposed and
adopted largely because of fear that Govern-
ment might unduly interfere with prized indi-
vidual liberties. The people wanted and de-
manded a Bill of Rights written into their
Constitution.... The Fifth, Sixth and Eighth
Amendments were pointedly aimed at confin-
ing exercise of power by courts and judges
within precise boundaries, particularly in the
procedure used for the trial of criminal cases.
15 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
16 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Is 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
20 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
21388 U.S. 14 (1967).
22 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
23 395 U.S. 74 (1969) (overruling Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).
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Past history provided strong reasons for the
apprehensions which brought these procedural
amendments into being and attest the wisdom
of their adoption.24
This, then, was the major thrust of the War-
ren Court, to apply the Bill of Rights to the
states and, for the first time, to provide for
every American, whether in federal or state
court, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.
In addition, in cases such as In re Gault25
and Specht v. Patterson,26 the Court extended
the basic protections of the Bill of Rights to
children accused of crime and to psychiatric
commitment cases. Through all of these, we
could see the death of a theory, the death of
the fifty "laboratories." No longer could every
state enforce its own laws, experimenting in
the field of criminal jurisprudence. The United
States Supreme Court had pre-empted the
field and from that point on, it would be in the
business of settling criminal disputes of consti-
tutional dimension.
It is no wonder that a tremendous number
of cases in the criminal field now crowd the
dockets of the Supreme Court, where once
civil cases predominated. This volume has also
been stimulated by the burgeoning of defender
systems throughout the country in response to
Gideon and Argersinger. Now, not only must
every issue in criminal justice be litigated in
the Supreme Court, but for the first time there
are also lawyers available to the poor to liti-
gate the problems peculiar to poverty law.
27
In the seventies the composition of the court
changed. Chief Justice Warren retired, Justices
Black and Harlan died, Justice Fortas left for
personal reasons, and President Nixon ap-
pointed four judges, all from the Law and
Order Bench-Rehnquist, Powell, Burger and
Blackmun. These Nixon appointees, joined by
Potter Stewart and Byron White, form the
new majority, resulting in the now familiar
six-to-three, with Douglas, Brennan and Mar-
shall on the short end in case after case. This
term was no exception. Justices Douglas,
24 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70-71
(1946) (Black, J., dissenting).
25 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
26 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
2
7 See generally, L. BENNER and B. LYNCH,
THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE (1973).
Brennan or Marhsall dissented in no less than
28 criminal cases this session, usually joining
together.
Let us now try to analyze the cases in this
term to see how they relate to cases decided by
the Warren Court and earlier precedents.
Miranda in Trouble
The first case we shall discuss is the impor-
tant case of Michigan v. Tucker,28 in which
the new Nixon majority attempts to restrict
the scope of Miranda v. Arizona.29 Miranda
contained four admonitions that the police
must give to a suspect taken into custody. The
arrestee must be informed that (a) he has the
privilege of remaining silent, (b) anything he
says can and may be used against him, (c) he
has a right to counsel during interrogation and
(d) if he is indigent, the state will appoint
counsel for him. It is this last warning which
was not given to the defendant Tucker.
There is no question that the Miranda deci-
sion applied to the fact situation in Tucker. In
determining the retroactivity and scope of Mi-
randa, the Supreme Court held that all cases
tried after June 13, 1966 (the date of the Mi-
randa decision), would come under the Mi-
randa order. Johnson v. New Jersey.30 Al-
though in Tucker the arrest and limited
warnings took place prior to June 13, 1966, the
case did not come to trial until after Miranda
had taken effect.
Several of the Justices of the Burger major-
ity seemed to think that inasmuch as these po-
lice warnings had been given prior to the date
of the Miranda decision, the Court should not
be too strict in applying those rules. After all,
the statements which the defendant gave the
police were not used against him at trial. In-
stead, a witness, whose name was disclosed to
the police by Tucker during the custodial in-
terrogation, was allowed to testify against the
accused at trial. Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, concluded that Miranda applies
only to the using at trial of statements made
by the defendant. It will not be used to exclude
the testimony of the derivative witness, because
the police were obviously unaware of the forth-
28 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
29 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
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coming Miranda decision when they interro-
gated the defendant and learned the identify of
the witness.
This analysis fails, however, because it has
always been clear that from June 13, 1966, to
date, every case tried would be governed by
the Miranda rules. To deviate from that doc-
trine at this late date without explicitly revers-
ing the earlier decision is hypocrisy.
Of course the Tucker case is further compli-
cated by another doctrine-fruit of the poison-
ous tree. Simply stated, it is that any evi-
dence illegally derived cannot be used for any
purpose whatsoever. This doctrine was first
enunciated in Elkins v. United States3' where
the Court barred evidence taken illegally by
federal officials from being used in a state
court. It has been reaffirmed in cases such as
Wong Sun v. United StateS32 where statements
taken from a witness whose location had been
illegally discovered were held to be inadmissi-
ble against the defendant for any purpose.
These two doctrines, Wong Sun and Mi-
randa, were solid in the law until the date of
this decision. Tucker, however, denies the en-
forcement of the poisoned fruit doctrine where
a defendant had been given an incomplete Mi-
randa warning. The fruit, the name of the sup-
posed (but injurious) alibi witness, was not
suppressed. The majority held that since the
voluntariness of the witness' statements was
not called into question, the testimony was ad-
missible at trial.
In lone dissent 3 Justice Douglas pointed out
that this decision weakens the thrust of both
Miranda and of the doctrine of the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
This decision is wrong in that it flies in the
face of the logic of both Miranda and Wong
Sun. Furthermore it encourages the police to
fail to give defendants their full Miranda warn-
ings, with the hope that some information
will be given from which they might derive
damaging evidence at trial. This is contrary to
31364 U.S. 206 (1960).
32 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
33 justice Brennan filed a separate opinion,
joined in by Justice Marshall, concurring in the
result. The basis for their concurrence, however,
is their reading of Johnson, supra note 30, and how
Miranda should be retroactively applied. They did
not agree with the reasoning used by the majority.
See 417 U.S. at 453 (Brennan, J., concurring).
the policy behind the Miranda decision. Mi-
randa was an attempt to discourage the police
from employing back room tactics (with physi-
cal and psychological rubber hoses), to dis-
courage the police from not fully advising the
accused of his or her rights and to erase the
anomaly of the illiterate first offender hanging
himself through ignorance of his rights while
the syndicate gangster, with full knowledge and
lawyers available, might walk the streets. The
Tucker decision joins the Burger Court's ear-
lier holding in Harris v. New York,3 4 in effec-
tively diluting the impact of Miranda. Both are
open to severe criticism, and both ignore the
reason behind the Miranda warnings and the
rationale of the Miranda decision. Michigan v.
Tucker opens further the door to the emascula-
tion of the Miranda doctrine. In the next term
we may see this work of the Warren Court re-
stricted again or, more honestly, overruled
completely.
The Exclusionary Rule
This last term the Burger Court handed
down its decision in Calandra v. United
States,35 further limiting the scope of the War-
ren Court's once strong exclusionary rule.
38
For some time now, Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Blackmun have
been commenting adversely on the rule, which
was extended to state prosecutions by the
Warren Court in Mapp v. Ohio.
37
The new majority attack on the venerable
exclusionary rule was launched by Chief Jus-
tice Burger in his dissenting opinion in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Agents. 38 In that case, peti-
tioner had alleged that on November 26, 1965,
34 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (confession taken in vio-
lation of Miranda can be used at trial for purposes
of impeaching the defendant).
For an excellent discussion of the relationship of
this case to the work of the Burger Court see
Dershowitz and Ely, Harris v. New York: Some
Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of
the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198
(1971).
35 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
36 The rule, which provides that evidence ille-
gally obtained from an accused may not be used
against him or her, was first established for fed-
eral courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914).
37 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
38403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting).
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while he was in his own apartment, six federal
narcotics agents entered his premises without a
warrant and without probable cause. They ar-
rested Bivens for alleged narcotics violations.
The petitioner was manacled in front of his
wife and children while the agents threatened to
arrest the entire family. The apartment was
searched from stem to stem. This suit was
brought by petitioner in federal district court
for $15,000 in damages from each agent. The
district court dismissed the case.39 The court
of appeals affirmed,40 but the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed the dismissal.
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, pointed out
that if deterrence was the rationale for the ex-
clusionary rule, then this case illustrated the
failure of that rule to deter the police from
making improper searches and seizures. There-
fore, he argued, the exclusionary rule ought to
be abandoned, since it had failed to achieve the
mission assigned to it.
Last term in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte4'
Justices Powell, Blackmun and Rehnquist, in a
concurring opinion, questioned whether viola-
tions of the fourth amendment could be raised
by way of collateral attack. The attack in Bi-
vens was in dissent, in Schneckloth concur-
rence, but this term the Burger majority has
launched an attack with more tangible results.
The Court in Calandra v. United States
abolished the exclusionary rule in the presenta-
tion of evidence to grand juries. Federal
agents had illegally seized papers belonging to
Calandra. These were presented to the grand
jury. Calandra moved to suppress the material
at this stage and asked that he not be required
to answer any questions in front of the grand
jury based on the suppressed evidence. The
district court granted this motion; the court of
appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed,
over the vigorous dissent of justices Douglas,
Brennan and Marshall. The dissent pointed out
that this case was on all fours with Silver-
thorne Lumber Company, Inc. v. United
States. 4 2 In that 1920 case federal agents had
unlawfully seized papers belonging to the Sil-
verthornes and their corporation and had pre-
sented the documents to a grand jury. The dis-
39 276 F. Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
40 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969).
41412 U.S. 218 (1973).
42251 U.S. 385 (1920).
trict court ordered the materials returned. The
grand jury returned the papers, but attempted
to recoup them by issuing a subpoena duces
tecum. The Silverthornes refused to comply
with the subpoena and were convicted of con-
tempt. The United States Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, reversed
this conviction, holding that "the essence of
the provision forbidding the acquisition of evi-
dence in a certain way is that not merely evi-
dence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court, but that it shall not be used at all."1
43
Mr. Justice Brennan said, in Calandra: "Sil-
verthorne plainly controls this case. Respond-
ent, like plaintiff in error in Silverthorne,
seeks to avoid furnishing the grand jury with
evidence that he would not have been called
upon to supply but for the unlawful search and
seizure . . . . [O]nly if Silverthorne is over-
ruled can its precedential force to compel af-
firmance here be denied."
44
The majority of the Court held that the ex-
clusionary rule should not apply to grand jury
proceedings. They reasoned that the rule's de-
terrent effect on police misconduct was less
important than protecting the grand jury pro-
ceedings from delay and disruption. The ma-
jority ignored the point made by the dissent
that the exclusionary rule is not merely de-
signed to deter police activity, but also at-
tempts to give content and meaning to the
fourth amendment's prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures and to prevent
the sanctioning of such misconduct by the
courts.
The effect of the majority's holding is to
open the door to abuse by the police due to the
lack of sanctions against unreasonable searches
and seizures. This decision can also be com-
pared to Harris v. New York45 which held
that even if Miranda warnings were not given,
the defendant's incriminating statements could
be used in court against him as impeachment if
he took the stand in his own defense and testi-
fied contrary to what he had told the police in
the station's backroom. When the Harris deci-
sion came down many commentators felt that
it had weakened the thrust of the decision of
43 Id. at 392.
44 414 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
45 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona.48
They pointed out that if the police were not al-
lowed to use any confession obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda, there would be no incentive
for the police to ever question a defendant
without giving him his Miranda warnings. If,
however, such a confession in the absence of
the warnings could be utilized by the police or
by the prosecution to "keep the defendant
honest," some police officers might be tempted
to take a confession in violation of Miranda so
that it could at least be used for purposes of
impeachment.
So too after Calandra, the abolition of the
exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedings
leads police to believe that the results of im-
proper searches and seizures will be admissible
in court for some purposes and, therefore,
might induce some police to violate the consti-
tutional rights of citizens in the hope of
achieving what they would consider a public
good.
The dissenting justices were especially dis-
tressed by the majority's view sanctioning ju-
dicial condonation of improper acts by the po-
lice. They pointed out that one of the purposes
of the exclusionary rule was to insure that
courts are not made parties to lawless inva-
sions of the constitutional rights of citizens by
permitting unhindered governmental use of the
fruits of such invasions. Furthermore, public
confidence in the judiciary would be eroded if
it participated in such unlawful acts.
Finally, Justice Brennan predicted that this
decision will be used to "bootstrap" future de-
cisions of the Court leading to the ultimate ab-
olition of the exclusionary rule:
In Mapp, the Court thought it had "close[d]
the only courtroom door remaining open to
evidence secured by official lawlessness in vio-
lation of Fourth Amendment rights." . .. The
door is still ajar. As a consequence, I am left
with the uneasy feeling that today's decision
may signal that a majority of my colleagues
have positioned themselves to reopen the door
still further and abandon altogether the exclu-
sionary rule in search and seizure cases.
47
The spectre of this fear lurks not only in the
48 See note 34 supra.
4 414 U.S. at 365 '(Brennan, J., dissenting)
(cite omitted).
Calandra decision, but its presence pervades
other decisions of the Burger Court as well, as
the civil liberties established in the sixties con-
tinue to be chipped away in the seventies in
the new majority's search for law and order.
The End of the Equal Protection Doctrine
for the Indigent
With this year's decision in Ross v.
Moffitt48 the long line of decisions guarantee-
ing equal rights for the indigent defendant has
come to an end. This line dates back to Powell
v. Alabama49 in which the Supreme Court
guaranteed the guiding hand of counsel to the
indigent accused of a capital crime. This doc-
trine was extended to anyone accused of a fel-
ony in Gideon v. Wainwright,50 and to anyone
accused of a crime with incarceration as pun-
ishment in Argersinger v. Hamlin.51 The
necessity of counsel at "critical stages" was de-
cided in Coleman v. Alabama 2 and Kirby v.
Illinois.53
The necessity of counsel at the appellate
level was decided in Douglas v. California,54
which guaranteed the right of an indigent de-
fendant to the assistance of counsel in the
preparation of the first appeal as of right. The
Supreme Court explicitly reserved for a fu-
ture decision the question of appointing coun-
sel for defendant's discretionary or secondary
level appeal-1 This was the backdrop against
which the case of Ross v. Moffitt appeared on
the docket of the Supreme Court. The Burger
Court held that the appointment of counsel
would be limited to first appeals as of right (as
48417 U.S. 600 (1974).
49 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
50 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
51407 U.S. 25 (1972).
52 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearings).
53 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (post-indictment lineups).
54372 U.S. 353 (1963). See also Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (indigent enti-
tled to free transcript on appeal); Lane v. Brown,
372 U.S. 477 (1963) (indegent may not be pre-
cluded from appeal by discretionary action of
public defender) ; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 709
(1961) (filing fee for processing habeas corpus ac-
tion may not bar indigent); Bums v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 252 (1959) (indigent may not be barred by
filing fee on motion for leave to appeal) ; Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (transcript, neces-
sary to appeal, must be provided without cost to
indigent).
55 372 U.S. at 356.
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in Douglas). Moffitt was charged with two
separate forgeries and had had court-appointed
counsel at both trials. He appealed both cases to
the North Carolina court of appeals and was
provided counsel at public expense in both ap-
peals. In one case the appointed counsel asked
to be appointed to assist in filing a request for
discretionary review by the North Carolina su-
preme court. In the other case the public de-
fender took the case to the state supreme court,
but review was denied. Request was made to
the trial court for appointment of counsel for
preparing a petition for writ of certiorari from
'the United States Supreme Court. In both
-cases, the requests for counsel to complete the
appellate process were denied. Moffitt sought
collateral relief in the federal courts, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held unanimously that he was entitled
to counsel in both cases. The Supreme Court
reversed.
In order to understand the gravity of this
decision and its effect upon the doctrine of
equal protection as it applies to indigent
-clients, one must first understand the rationale
of the Douglas decision. It held that whatever
avenue of review was available to a rich de-
fendant must be equally available to an indi-
gent. If the state supreme court did not review
any criminal cases, the indigent would not
need any special considerations. But the state
court does provide such review, and the indi-
gent does need special consideration as this re-
view is undeniably costly. As Justice Rehn-
,quist, writing for the majority in Moffitt,
conceded, "The[se] decisions discussed above
stand for the proposition that a state cannot
arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents
while leaving open avenues of appeal for more
affluent persons." 56 Therefore, if the state su-
preme court reviews petitions prepared by
counsel retained by rich clients, it must, of ne-
cessity, be prepared to review petitions by in-
,digents, and supply counsel when necessary to
inake this review meaningful.
It is important to note that perhaps the
hardest work in the law, requiring the greatest
skill, is the formulating of petitions for review
in the United States Supreme Court or in state
supreme courts, where the court does not
50417 U.S. at 607.
have to hear every case presented to it. It re-
quires the greatest ability of counsel to capsul-
ize the arguments and raise the issues in a
lawyer-like manner, to provide the court with
a clearly framed problem, capable of forming
the basis of a decision to grant or to deny re-
view. As Justice Haynsworth put it in the
Moffitt case in the court of appeals:
An indigent defendant is as much in need of
assistance of a lawyer in preparing and filing
a petition for a certiorari as he is in the han-
dling of an appeal as of right. In many ap-
peals, an articulate defendant could file an
effective brief by telling his story in simple
language without legalisms, but the technical
requirement for applications for writs of cer-
tiorari are hazards which one untrained in the
law could hardly be expected to negotiate.57
And Justice Haynsworth quoted one commen-
tator as saying:
'Certiorari proceedings constitute a highly spe-
cialized aspect of appellate work. The factors
which [a court] deems important in connec-
tion with deciding whether to grant certiorari
are certainly not within the normal knowledge
of an indigent appellant.' Boskey, The Right to
Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 Minn. L.
Rev. 783, 797 (1961).58
In the Supreme Court, Justices Douglas, Bren-
nan and Marshall again dissented, quoting Jus-
tice Haynsworth at length. They concluded:
Douglas v. California was grounded on con-
cepts of fairness and equality. The right to
discretionary review is a substantial one, and
one where a lawyer can be of significant as-
sistance to an indigent defendant. It was cor-
rectly perceived below that the "same concepts
of fairness and equality, which require counsel
in a first appeal of right, require counsel in
other and subsequent discretionary appeals." 5
The import of this decision is clear. No
longer will indigent defendants be able to pur-
sue their rights of appeal through to the state
or United States highest courts. An affluent ac-
cused can "take his case all they way up," but
57 483 F.2d at 653.58Id. See Magnum Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159,
163 (1923); Farness, Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze
Insurance Association, 242 U.S. 430, 434 (1917).
59 417 U.S. at 619 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the poor defendant must be satisfied with one
chance.
The Question of Recoupment or "Chilling" the
Right to Counsel
In 1972 the Supreme Court decided, in
James v. Strange,60 that a Kansas statute, re-
quiring an indigent defendant to repay the
state for the cost of appointed counsel, was un-
constitutional in that its provision denied
defendant/debtors the normal defenses of the
voluntary debtor, thus amounting to a vio-
lation of the equal protection guaranteed to in-
digents. The defendant in Strange was ordered
to pay $500 for the services of his court ap-
pointed attorney, should he become able to do
so. Appeal of this order to a three-judge fed-
eral court was successful, and the statue was
declared unconstitutional on its face, in that it
would have a "chilling effect" on the exercise
of the right to counsel. A poor defendant with
a family might be afraid to fight his case fully,
if he knows that the lawyer's fees would hang
over his head, win or lose. Furthermore, since
a jury trial would cost him more in attorney's
fees than a trial to the bench, he might be in-
clined to forego the former "luxury." Such a
situation would be antithetical to the reasoning
of the Court in Griffin v. Illinois6' where it
was held that, "[T]he quality of justice should
not depend upon a person's pocketbook." 62 On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court sus-
tained the finding of unconstitutionality, but on
the narrower grounds of the defendant's posi-
tion as debtor.
This term, in Fuller v. Oregon,62 the Court
held that an Oregon defendant could be given
probation, conditioned upon his repayment of
counsel and investigator fees should he be able
to do so. The Oregon recoupment statute did
not contain the provisions which were held un-
constitutional in Strange. The Burger Court
decided that this difference alleviated the taint,
despite the point made by the dissent (Brennan
and Marshall) that no other debtor could go to
jail for defaulting, while Fuller's probation
could be revoked for the same action.
It is important to note that none of the Jus-
60407 U.S. 128 (1972).
61351 U.S. 12 (1956).
62 Id. at 19.
63 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
tices seemed alarmed about the "chilling effect"
to the extent that the Kansas or the three-
judge court were in James v. Strange.64 What-
ever the force of the Fuller decision will be, in
tandem with Ross v. Moffitt, these cases
effectively cut the opportunity for indigent de-
fendants at both the trial and appellate levels
to be represented by counsel to the fullest ex-
tent contemplated by law. 65 At the trial level
the defendant may hesitate to accept appointed
counsel rather than accept an open-ended bill
for services. On appeal he or she will be fore-
closed from the assistance of counsel at one of
the most important steps in the case.
Whether this will aid in reducing the back-
log of the courts or cut down on the costs of
indigent representation is yet to be seen, but
it is a far cry from the grand principles estab-
lished in Douglas v. California and Gideon v.
Wainwright.
Prison Cases-The Right to Counsel
Contrary to the over-all trend of its deci-
sions, the Burger Court has, in past terms, ex-
tended the right-to-counsel, as guaranteed in
the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, to defendants at probation and pa-
role revocation hearings. 66 This term the Court
limited the role of counsel in a similar situa-
tion.
In Wolff v. McDonnell 67 the new majority
were asked to decide which of the many rights
previously held to be implicit in the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause should be
granted to prisoners facing prison disciplinary
hearings with possible punishment by solitary
confinement and loss of "good-time." 6s The
Court held that, although some rights apply,
64James v. Strange, 323 F. Supp. 1230 (D-
Kans. 1971).
65 This represents a significant number of the
cases crowding our criminal dockets. According to,
the National Defender Survey conducted by the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association in
1972, 65 per cent of the felony cases and 47 per
cent of the misdemeanor cases required public
counsel.
66 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411, U.S. 778 (1973)
(parole) ; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (probation).
67 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
68 "Good-time" refers to the accumulation of
time to be deducted from a sentence, earned by
extended periods of good behavior. This can be
awarded either by a statutory scheme or by prison
discretionary decisions or both.
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neither the right to counsel, nor the right to
-confront the witnesses against him or her, are
constitutionally guaranteed a prisoner. Justices
Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, as in so many
-of these cases, joined in dissent.
The Abolition of the Warrant Requirement in
Automobile Cases
In Cardwell v. Lewis69 the familiar six-to-
'three configuration was given a welcome rest.
A plurality of four justices70 upheld the war-
rantless seizure of an automobile from a public
parking lot while the defendant was held in
-custody at the nearby police station. Defendant
Lewis was suspected of murder. At the request
of the police, he drove to the police station,
parking his car in a commercial lot. He was
-arrested, and the keys to his car and his park-
ing lot claim ticket were taken from him. The
warrantless search of the impounded car
turned up incriminating evidence. The decision
-of the Court upheld the use of this evidence at
trial.
Justice Blackmun, for the plurality, argued
that the search of an automobile is far less in-
trusive on fourth amendment rights of an indi-
vidual than would be the search of his person or
'his house, thereore the standard in requiring
warrants for these searches need not be as
strict.
The dissenting Justices pointed out that al-
though there is a line of cases establishing a
precedent for distinguishing automobile search
-cases from other searches, any distinction was
based upon the mobility of the auto. In the
-case at bar, it was argued, the car was inacces-
sible to the defendant, with no possibility of
being moved.
The possible impact of this case on the war-
rant requirement, or absence thereof, in auto
searches is highlighted by comparing it to the
landmark Warren Court decision in Preston v.
United States.7' Justice Black speaking for a
unanimous Court, carefully delineated under
69 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
70 The opinion was written by Justice Black-
nun, joined by Chief justice Burger and Justices
White and Rehnquist. A four-man dissent was
written by Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Douglas, Brennan and Marshall. Justice Powell
took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
71376 U.S. 364 (1964). See also Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
what circumstances warrantless searches and
seizures of automobiles would be allowed. De-
fendant Preston's conviction was reversed
when the warrantless search of his car parked
in a garage while he was in police custody was
held to be in violation of his constitutional
rights. The Court held that if a warrant were
absent, the search was limited to one incident
to an arrest or in specific exigent circum-
stances.
The Preston case would seem to be tacitly
overruled by Cardwell. Certainly the care with
which the Warren Court examined what used
to be a special, limited exception to a general
rule is no where in evidence in the plurality
decision. Whether a later case with the com-
pelling weight of a majority opinion will more
clearly delineate the Court's position in this
area remains to be seen.
Search of Dwellings
Consistent with its expansion of all excep-
tions until they threaten the existence of the
rule, the Burger Court allowed a third-party
consent for a search to justify the warrantless
search of an entire house.
In United States v. Matlock72 the Court ap-
proved the search, absent a warrant, of defend-
ant's living quarters on the theory that a third
party had given valid consent. The police
knocked at the Matlock's dwelling. His girl-
friend answered. The police asked if they could
search the defendant's living quarters. The
areas searched included a bedroom shared by
Matlock and this girlfriend. The evidence
found was used to convict the defendant.
Until this case, the most extensive search al-
lowed by the Supreme Court in a third-party
consent situation had involved the search of a
duffel bag.7 3 This case represents a stretching
of the consent exception beyond any previous
limits. The Court sanctioned three separate
searches of the house (including the kitchen,
pantry, living room and upstairs bedroom)
even though no attempt was made by the
officers to procure a search warrant on any of
these occasions.
Justice Douglas, in dissent said that the au-
thorities should have obtained a search warrant
72 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
73 Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
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where there was an opportunity to do so, ab-
sent any grave emergency (such as imminent
loss of evidence or danger to human life or
safety). The dissent further argued that the
search in this case could never have been sup-
ported by a warrant describing with particular-
ity the places and things to be searched. If the
search could not have been authorized by war-
rant, "[i]t is inconceivable that a search
conducted without a warrant can give more
authority than a search conducted with a
warrant." 74
According to justice Douglas, this case is a
substantial departure from previous Supreme
Court cases requiring special circumstances to
support an exceptional, warrantless search.
7 5
(Justices Brennan and Marshall, in their dis-
sent, reaffirmed their dissent in last term's
Schneckloth v. Bustainonte6 decision, that a
person cannot give consent to search without
knowledge of a right to deny access.) The
facts of this case are clouded by the shared
status of the bedroom, but, nevertheless, the
decision contributes to the general reversal of
the affirmative steps taken by the Warren
Court.
Fourth Amendment Rights on the Decline
The most serious step backward taken by the
Burger Court, a step away from the belief that
the Bill of Rights are guaranteed to each citi-
zen in every court, is evidenced by the deci-
sions in Robinson v. United States77 and Gus-
tafson v. Florida.78 The question to be resolved
was the scope of an allowable search of a
person validly stopped and arrested for a traffic
citation.
Three important points must be kept in mind
while discussing these cases:
(1) There was a valid stop in each case,
with no question as to probable cause;
(2) There was only a search of the person,
not an automobile search;
74 415 U.S. at 187 (Douglas, J., dissenting).75 See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493
(1958); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451
(1948); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699
(1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948).
26 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
77 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
7s 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
(3) The remaining constitutional question is
limited to the allowable scope of such a
search incident to a traffic arrest.
In Robinson a police officer stopped the de-
fendant because it was believed that he was.
driving without a current license. Probable-
cause for the arrest was conceded. The search.
resulted in a crumpled cigarette pack being dis-
covered in a coat pocket. Inside the pack,-
opened by the officer, were 14 capsules of a
substance later identified as heroin. The officer
did not hesitate to open the pack, even though
there was no claim that there was any fear of'
a concealed weapon within.
In Gustafson the car which was stopped had.
been observed weaving across the center line
"three or four times." It also had out-of-state-
plates. The driver, a student, was found to be-
without his operator's license. He was arrested,.
and a search revealed a cigarette pack. The of-
ficer opened this and found marijuana ciga--
rettes. Gustafson was charged with possession,
and the marijuana was introduced against him-
at trial.
These cases departed from the rule estab-
lished in a majority of jurisdictions, where the
police could not conduct warrantless searches-
of "mere traffic violators."
In dissent, the liberal minority of three con-
ceded that the officer should have the right to.
pat down any person stopped to protect the of-
ficer against hidden weapons, even a traffic
arrestee. They made an analogy to stop-and-
frisk decisions decided in past terms. They re-
fused, however, to agree that any previous-
cases gave rise to the decisions in either case.
(The majority rejected the stop-and-frisk anal-
ogy because those cases arose from situations
without probable cause for arrest, while here-
this was not argued.)
The implications of this decision are fright-
ening. Every person driving a car who is
stopped for a traffic violation may be spread-
eagled and searched, with no particular object
of the inspection ever formulated. Prior to.
these cases, there was no encouragement for
the police to conduct more than a mere pat-
down for weapons in traffic arrests. Now that-
anything the police turns up can lead to a con-
viction, the police may be motivated to make
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arrests for manufactured traffic violations in
order to search for possible contraband.
More important is the way the Burger Court
achieves its objective of withdrawing from po-
sitions established in the sixties. Instead of a
decision with integrity, admitting an affirma-
tive will to change procedure, we are subjected
to a review of the past cases, used to support a
new position. For now the outlook remains
ominous, at best a disturbing uncertainty. The
pendulum continues, further and further from
the liberal position of the sixties. Our hope lies
in the expectation that it may soon reach the end
of its tether and begin the long swing back.
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